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There are two distinct accounts of academic freedom.'
The first refers to professional ideals of university
governance, the second to principles of constitutional law.
Viewed as an ideal of university governance, academic
freedom is essential to the ongoing administration of
institutions of higher education. The American concept of
academic freedom began in the early years of the twentieth
century. Its first great statement was in the 1915
Declaration of Principles of Academic Freedom by the
American Association of University Professors (AAUP).2
The president of the Association at that time was John
Dewey. The principal drafters of the 1915 Declaration
were the economist Edwin R. A. Seligman and the
philosopher Arthur 0. Lovejoy.3
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1. See Walter P. Metzger, Profession and Constitution: Two Definitions of
Academic Freedom in America, 66 TEXAS L. REv. 1265 (1988); David M. Rabban,
Academic Freedom in LEONARD W. LEVY & KENNETH L KARST, EDS.,
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 12-13 (New York: MacMillan
Pub. Co. 1986).
2. The text is reproduced in full at the AAUP web site: 1915 Declaration of
Principles on Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure, http://www.aaup.org/
AAUP/pubsres/policydocs/contents/1915.htm (last visited Mar. 16, 2012).
On the authorship of the Declaration, see Walter P. Metzger, The 1940 Statement
of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, 53 LAW & CONT. PROBLEMS 3, 12-
13 (1990).
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For most private universities like Yale, the legal source
of academic freedom lies in contractual provisions
guaranteeing academic freedom. These provisions are
typically interpreted by reference to the 1940 Statement on
Principles of Academic Freedom and Tenure, which was
co-drafted by the AAUP, and which is generally regarded
as the authoritative text on academic freedom in the United
States.4
The AAUP has heard and adjudicated complaints
about violations of academic freedom since its founding in
1915, and it has developed a sophisticated caselaw
regarding the scholarly ideal of academic freedom. Its
decisions constitute a form of soft law that has been highly
influential in academic and legal communities.' The AAUP
presently maintains a list of censored universities that it
believes have violated fundamental principles of academic
freedom.
The professional ideal of academic freedom has four
distinct components.6 The first is freedom of research and
publication, which affirms that scholars should be free to
study and research and to publish the results of their
research. The second is freedom of teaching, or, as it is
sometimes called, freedom in the classroom. The third is
freedom of "extramural" speech, which refers to the
capacity of faculty to make public pronouncements as
citizens about matters that are unrelated to their scholarly
expertise. If I am a scholar of computer programming and
if my university seeks to penalize me for public statements
about the war in Iraq that have nothing to do with
computer programming, my freedom of extramural speech
is at stake. The fourth is freedom of "intramural" speech,
4. The 1940 Statement, which has been endorsed by more than 200 educational
societies and groups, is also reproduced in full at the AAUP website:
http://www.aaup.org/AAUP/pubsres/policydocs/contents/1940statement.htm. The
website also contains a list of the Statement's endorsers.
5. For an account of the "soft law" of the AAUP, see MATTHEW W. FINKIN &
ROBERT C. POST, FOR THE COMMON GOOD: PRINCIPLES OF AMERICAN
ACADEMIC FREEDOM (Yale University Press 2009).




which refers to the capacity of faculty to discuss the internal
governance of universities.
Professor Schauer is correct that the professional ideal
of academic freedom is incompatible with the most basic
principles of ordinary First Amendment rights.' If I ask my
colleagues what academic freedom means to them, they
typically report that academic freedom consists of rights
that are analogous to constitutional rights of freedom of
expression. But this is not correct.
First Amendment rights ensure that persons can assert
opinions without fear of penalty. That is why the Court has
ruled that under the First Amendment there is no such
thing as a false idea.' The famous theorist Alexander
Meiklejohn has summarized the point by observing that
within the domain of the First Amendment there must be
an "equality of status in the field of ideas."9
This conclusion is incompatible with the professional
ideal of academic freedom. Universities routinely and
properly judge scholars on the quality of their ideas.
Depending upon the merit of their scholarship, professors
do or do not receive tenure; they are or are not hired; they
do or do not receive financial support; and so on. Whereas
First Amendment rights are constructed to safeguard a
speaker's ability to assert whatever ideas she wishes,
academic freedom protects no such liberty.
Properly understood, academic freedom safeguards a
scholar's capacity competently to perform her scholarship.
It seeks to ensure that faculty will not be penalized for their
scholarship, except on grounds of incompetence or material
malfeasance. And it also requires that the competence of
scholarship must be evaluated by scholars rather than by
lay persons. The 1915 Declaration is quite explicit that
7. See Frederick Schauer, The Permutations of Academic Freedom, 65 ARK. L.
REV. 191 (2012).
8. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-340 (1974) ("Under the First
Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion may
seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the
competition of other ideas.").
9. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 27 (1965).
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academic freedom is "not the absolute freedom of
utterance of the individual scholar, but the absolute
freedom of thought, of inquiry, of discussion and of
teaching, of the academic profession."
Academic freedom is thus compatible with a physicist
being denied tenure because he is incompetent, so long as
the question of incompetence is determined by competent
physicists rather than by lay administrators. Whether nor
not a physicist is incompetent must be determined by the
application of the disciplinary standards of physics.
At root, therefore, the professional ideal of academic
freedom refers to the self-regulation of the academic
profession. The basic idea is that professional scholars are
experts who can distinguish competent from incompetent
scholarship, whereas lay members of the public are
incapable of making such judgments. To know whether
evolution is good scholarship, one must ask a certified
biologist, not a lay member of the public, and certainly not
a theologian or a politician.
Academic freedom in its constitutional sense has an
entirely different structure. As with most constitutional
rights in the United States, constitutional academic
freedom is triggered only by state action. It applies only
against public universities or against actions by the state
that apply to all universities. The professional academic
freedom applies to all institutions of higher education, and
it concerns university ideals of self-governance; by contrast
constitutional academic freedom concerns limitations on
state power. It constrains the state in its role as a public
institution (like a state university) or in its role as a public
lawmaker that regulates all universities, public and private.
A constitutional claim against the state requires a
constitutional reason why the state may not act in a
particular way. That the state may violate the professional
ideal of academic freedom is not, prima facie, such a
constitutional reason.
What might such a reason be? The United States
Supreme Court has, since the late 1950s, trumpeted the




But the Court's cases discussing academic freedom are
incoherent. The doctrine, as one famous scholar put it,
floats in the law, picking up decisions as a hull does
barnacles.10
When I was younger, I believed that the paradigm case
of constitutional academic freedom concerned the
penalization of faculty at public universities in ways
inconsistent with the mission of public universities.
Because the mission of public universities, like the mission
of all universities, is to expand and disseminate knowledge,
and because expert knowledge is defined and constituted
by disciplinary standards, university actions inconsistent
with the professional ideal of academic freedom were likely
to contradict the mission of public universities and hence to
violate constitutional academic freedom.
But I now believe that this account is incomplete. It
does not explain how constitutional academic freedom
might constrain state decision-making in its role as a
legislator. What would preclude a state from passing
general legislation redefining the mission of institutions of
higher education, whether public or private? Without an
answer to this question, constitutional academic freedom
stands without a ground.
The purpose of the First Amendment is to protect the
freedom of persons to participate in the formation of public
opinion. This freedom is essential to democracy, because a
democratic state is one in which goverfiment is responsive
to public opinion. By safeguarding access to public-opinion
formation, therefore, the First Amendment protects the
democratic legitimacy of our government. I shall use the
term "public discourse" to refer to the communicative acts
deemed necessary for the free formation of public opinion.
Because all persons have an equal right to influence
the creation of public opinion, the First Amendment
10. J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A "Special Concern of the First
Amendment," 99 YALE L.J. 251, 253 (1989).
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requires that all ideas in public discourse be treated equally.
The postulate of equality does not express the equality of
ideas, but the equality of persons. Every person has an
equal right to participate in public discourse and so to
attempt to shape the contours of public opinion. The
democratic legitimacy of the state inheres in the hope that
our participation might alter public opinion in ways that
will make government responsive to our views. Because
democratic legitimation is ultimately subjective-because it
inheres in what we each think about our government-First
Amendment doctrine ultimately protects subjective rights.
If we ask why we join together to debate in public
discourse, the answer is that we deliberate in order to
decide what we should do. When we decide upon a course
of action, whether it be to create a social security system or
an educational system or a health care system, we do so by
establishing organizations designed to implement, our
decisions. If we decide to create a social-security system,
we create an organization that will hand out social-security
checks. If we decide to instruct our children, we create
institutions that dispense education.
What, then, is an organization? An organization is an
assembly of persons and resources that is arranged so as to
achieve a particular mission, whatever that mission may be:
national defense (the armed forces), justice (courts), social-
security checks (a social-security bureaucracy), or higher
education (public universities). To achieve its goal, an
organization must be able to manage the people and
resources within its control. This means it must also be able
to manage the speech of persons within its control.n
The supervisor of a social-security office must be
empowered to discipline an employee who instead of
handing out social security checks decides to stand on his
desk and recite poetry. The supervisor must also be
11. For a full discussion, see Robert Post, Between Governance and





empowered to discipline the employee who improperly says
to clients, "You will not receive your check." This implies
that state organizations must be able to regulate the speech
of persons within their control in ways that are completely
different from the ways in which the state can regulate
public discourse. And it also implies that state
organizations cannot penalize speech within their control
unless it is necessary in order to advance their mission.
I used to believe that constitutional academic freedom
could be explained in this way. I used to believe that
constitutional academic freedom signified no more than
that state universities regulating the speech of professors
could not do so in ways that were inconsistent with their
mission. If the mission of universities is to advance
knowledge, then state universities can not regulate the
speech of faculty in ways that were inconsistent with this
mission, which is to say in ways that are inconsistent with
the professional ideal of academic freedom.
A few years ago, however, I realized that this picture
fails to explain why a state can not alter the mission of its
universities. If academic freedom were truly a distinctive
constitutional value, it must prevent the state from
redefining the purpose of universities. It must explain why
the state cannot issue certain kinds of general regulations
that adversely affect private universities, where the
managerial authority of the state is not at issue.
In Grutter v. Bollinger,12 for example, the Supreme
Court invoked the academic freedom of universities as a
special concern of the First Amendment, and in so doing it
conceived academic freedom as limiting the state's ability
to regulate private universities. The organizational account
I once had of academic freedom was relevant only to the
internal management of public universities. It said nothing
about the general regulatory powers of the state.
Many of you might now be hypothesizing that a
constitutional right of academic freedom should derive
directly from the First Amendment value of the
12. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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marketplace of ideas. This value first appeared in Justice
Holmes's famous dissent in Abrams in 1919,'1 and it has
ever since been associated with the goal of protecting the
creation of knowledge. The Court has often associated the
constitutional right of academic freedom with the value of
the marketplace of ideas, and this might cause you to be
skeptical about whether I have located any deep
constitutional difficulty. You might think that state
regulations that inhibit the marketplace of ideas pro tanto
infringe on the First Amendment. Because universities are
institutions that foster the marketplace of ideas, the First
Amendment principle of the marketplace of ideas would
limit the ability of the state to regulate private universities.
To analyze this claim, however, we need to be precise
about the goal of universities. If we take the University of
Arkansas as an example, we find that as a "flagship public
research university" its goal is in part "to grow the state's
knowledge-based economy and to address major issues
confronting Arkansas and the world." 14 Like all public
universities, therefore, the University of Arkansas aspires
to increase and distribute knowledge.
The difficulty is that a marketplace of ideas does not
produce knowledge. I know that this claim is a little
counter-intuitive. But think for a moment about the actual
circumstances under which our society produces
knowledge. Think about scientific journals like Lancet or
Nature. The point of these journals is to advance
knowledge, yet their editors emphatically do not operate
according to the marketplace of ideas. They do not publish
every manuscript that is sent to them, on a first-come-first-
serve basis. Instead they publish only the articles they
consider to be the best of their kind.
The point of the ideal of the marketplace of ideas is to
prevent discrimination of this kind. The marketplace of
ideas is designed precisely to eliminate content
13. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
14. Faculty Handbook, Office of the Provost and Vice Chancellor for
Academic Affairs, University of Arkansas, http://provost.uark.edu/72.php (last




discrimination. It is supposed to enshrine an equality in the
field of ideas. Yet if the editors of scientific journals cannot
separate trash from excellence, their journals cannot serve
as a venue for the advancement of knowledge.
If we scrutinize the institutions which actually produce
knowledge in modern societies, like universities, we find
that none of them exemplify the marketplace of ideas. All
such institutions apply the kinds of professional norms of
competence that we see utilized in the context of scientific
journals.
Put bluntly, if the marketplace of ideas requires that
there be no such thing as a false idea, then the marketplace
of ideas cannot ever acknowledge any such thing as a true
idea. The marketplace of ideas requires an equality of
status in the field of ideas, but the advancement of
knowledge by contrast requires precisely that we
distinguish better ideas from worse ideas. In the context of
knowledge, especially in the context of the complex forms
of expertise that are taught in universities, we require
disciplinary norms to distinguish good ideas from bad ideas.
If this sounds odd to you, consider what happens when
you go to your doctor. If your doctor tells you that you
have a serious medical problem and gives you medical
advice "X" to deal with the problem, and if you follow X
and consequently suffer harm, you may be tempted to sue
the doctor for malpractice for advice X. In such a suit, the
doctor will not be permitted to construct a First
Amendment defense to liability for X. The doctor will not
be heard to say, as Holmes said in the context of inventing
the marketplace of ideas in Abrams, that X "is an
experiment, as all life is an experiment." The doctor will
not be able to assert that under the First Amendment there
is no such thing as a false opinion.
To the contrary, the doctor will be liable if X fails
relevant standards of medical competence. The law will
expect the doctor to communicate to you medical
knowledge that passes the test of medical practice. We
expect no less of professors at a state's flagship research
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university. Otherwise the university can not aspire to grow
a knowledge-based economy.
If we wish to advance society's interests in the
production of knowledge, therefore, the marketplace of
ideas is not a helpful ideal. This implies that constitutional
academic freedom can not rest on the principle of the
marketplace of ideas. It must instead rest on a different
constitutional value, a value that concerns the production
and distribution of knowledge. In recent work, I have
called this value "democratic competence."" Democratic
competence must be distinguished from democratic
legitimation, which protects the free formation of public
opinion.
It is fascinating to note that there are strands of
contemporary First Amendment doctrine that, when
carefully parsed, seem to exemplify the value of democratic
competence. The First Amendment can not serve the value
of democratic competence within public discourse, because
the primary goal of public discourse is the formation of
public opinion, and opinion is distinct from knowledge. We
protect the free formation of public opinion in order to
maximize the possibility of democratic legitimation for all
citizens.
We can therefore expect to observe First Amendment
doctrine serving the value of democratic competence only
in situations that are outside of public discourse. Consider
again the medical hypothetical we have been discussing: If
your doctor offers you incompetent advice X, you may sue
the doctor for malpractice, and the doctor may not invoke
the First Amendment as a defense. Your doctor will be
held to applicable standards of professional care. But if
your doctor goes on the Jay Leno show and advises X to
the general public, and if in reliance on the doctor some
member of the public P decides to follow X and is
consequently injured, the doctor will be entitled to a First
Amendment defense in a suit by P for malpractice.
15. ROBERT POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A FIRST





The difference lies in the fact that a doctor talking on
the Jay Leno show is addressing the public, and is therefore
constitutionally characterized as participating in public
discourse. He is attempting to influence public opinion,
and the state must be cautious about censoring his attempt
based upon the disciplinary standards of the medical
profession. Doctrinally speaking, the doctor's assertions
will most likely be classified as opinions that can be neither
true nor false. .
By contrast, a doctor offering her patient the identical
advice X is not constitutionally characterized as attempting
to affect the formation of public opinion; she is instead
understood to be practicing medicine. Because in this
context X is communicated outside of public discourse, the
law is free to hold the doctor to the standards of knowledge
of the medical profession.
When the doctor addresses the general public, our
constitutional commitment is to the constitutional value of
democratic legitimation, and we protect that value by
characterizing X as constitutionally protected opinion. The
general rule in public discourse is caveat emptor. P can rely
on expert advice communicated in public discourse only at
his own risk. Within public discourse, the law will not
underwrite or enforce claims to knowledge. It will instead
transform disputed claims of knowledge into controversies
about opinion.
Outside of public discourse, by contrast, the law is free
to protect the communication of knowledge. And a First
Amendment commitment to the distribution of that
knowledge becomes apparent when the state seeks to
compel the communication of false knowledge, or when the
state seeks to prevent the communication of true
knowledge. Thus when Nebraska recently enacted
legislation requiring doctors to offer false opinions to
patients seeking an abortion, a federal district court had no
difficulty striking down the statute as inconsistent with the
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First Amendment rights of doctors.16 Or when Congress in
the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of 200517 prohibited lawyers from advising
clients that they had a right to incur debt in contemplation
of bankruptcy, a right that clients in fact possessed, courts
considering the question immediately realized that
prohibiting the communication of true legal knowledge
raised serious First Amendment concerns. Every court to
consider this provision of the Bankruptcy Act intuited the
presence of a First Amendment problem, even though the
constitution would have no relevance to ordinary
malpractice litigation in which lawyers might be compelled
to speak, or might be prohibited from speaking, in ways
that contravene accepted standards of legal practice.
Cases like these suggest that important strands of First
Amendment doctrine are quite attuned to the distribution
of knowledge outside the channels of public-opinion
formation. This has important implications for our
consideration of the constitutional value of academic
freedom. It suggests that there is independent
constitutional value to the production and distribution of
knowledge. This value can sustain a coherent First
Amendment jurisprudence of academic freedom. It is a
jurisprudence that ultimately would protect universities as
unique sites that specialize in the development and
reproduction of the disciplinary standards that define and
enable expert forms of knowledge. It would mean that any
effort of the state to compromise the development and
reproduction of such disciplinary standards would at least
raise intelligible First Amendment questions.
16. Planned Parenthood v. Heineman, 724 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1048 (D. Neb.
2010). See also Planned Parenthood Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota v.
Daugaard, 799 F. Supp. 2d 1048 (D.S.D. 2011).
17. Pub. L. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23, enacted April 20, 2005, codified at 11 U.S.C. §
526(a)(4) (2011).
18. The provision was ultimately upheld by a creative reading of the statute
that interpreted it to allow lawyers to disclose all advice that might otherwise be true





This is the account of constitutional academic freedom
that I seek to develop in my most recent book.19 The
account solves many of the puzzles that presently afflict
judicial decisionmaking involving constitutional academic
freedom.
To pick only one example, courts are presently deeply
confused about whether the right of academic freedom
attaches to universities as institutions or instead to faculty
members as individuals. Many courts say that universities
hold the academic-freedom rights, not individual
professors. Thus if a professor sues her university alleging a
violation of academic freedom, many courts might say that
it is the academic freedom of the university, not that of the
professor, which is at stake. Other courts, by contrast, hold
the opposite view, that individual professors hold academic-
freedom rights, not universities.
The analysis I am offering suggests that this whole
debate is misguided. Academic freedom inheres neither in
individual faculty nor in universities as institutions, but
instead in the disciplinary standards that define and
produce knowledge and that are nourished within properly
functioning universities. If a university penalizes professors
in ways that are inconsistent with the disciplinary standards
that define knowledge, it is acting inconsistently with
academic freedom. Similarly, if an individual faculty
member acts in ways inconsistent with disciplinary
standards, she does not merit the protection of academic
freedom. Disciplinary standards are the locus of
constitutional academic freedom because such standards
create and propel new knowledge.
19. See POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, ACADEMIC FREEDOM, supra note
15.
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